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I. INTRODUCTION
The status of the "learned professions"' under the antitrust laws has
long been an unsettled question. 2 This uncertainty is of great concern to
professionals, many of whose activities could be viewed as anticompetitive.
3
Law, medicine and other professions have strict requirements for admission,
4
often have associations which set standards for their practices, and often are
adverse to new and different methods of providing their services to the pub-
lic. 5 While strong ethical considerations have been advanced for many of
these practices, 6 arguments have also been made that the primary purpose of
these practices is to limit competition among professionals in order to main-
tain high costs of services and ensure lucrative earnings.
7
1. At the time of the American Revolution, it was stated that "with regard to
the learned professions, little need be observed; they truly form no distinct interest in
society and according to their situation and talents, will be indiscriminately the ob-
jects of the confidence and choice of each other, and of other parts of the commu-
nity." THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 219-20 (H. Dawson ed. 1864). The genesis of the
term "learned profession" as used in antitrust analysis is found in The Schooner
Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506 (C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388). For a discussion of how this
case was used in later antitrust analysis, see note 22 infia.
Some of the various occupations that have been considered "professions" in cer-
tain antitrust contexts include the following: accountants, architects, clergymen, den-
tists, doctors, engineers, lawyers, opticians, optometrists, pharmacists, real estate
brokers and veterinarians. Bauer, Professional Activitites and the Antitrust Laws, 50 No-
TRE DAME LAW. 570, 570 n.6 (1975). See also J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 49.01[11] n.1 (1979).
2. For a discussion of when the Supreme Court first directly addressed the liabil-
ity of professionals under the antitrust laws and the remaining questions of how pro-
fessionals are to be treated under the antitrust laws, see notes 8-10 and accompanying
text ihfra.
3. Various practices of professionals have been challenged as anticompetitive.
See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (setting of
maximum fees); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978) (prohibition of competitive bidding); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(prohibition of advertising); American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 1980-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) $ 63,569 (2d Cir. 1980) (restraints on advertising, solicitation, and contract
practices), ajid by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982); Hyde v. Jefferson Parish
Hosp., 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982) (denial of hospital staff privileges).
4. See, e.g., 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1983) (various statutes regulating
professionals such as physicians, surgeons, dentists, accountants, and engineers).
5. See generally Sims, Maricopa: Are the Professions Different?, 52 ANTITRUST L.J.
177 (1983).
6. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978) (ban on competitive bidding by professional engineers asserted to protect the
public welfare). For a further discussion of Professional Engineers, see notes 63-69 and
accompanying text infra.
7. See, e.g., Ronwin v. State Bar, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub
nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983), and cert. denied sub nom. Ronwin v.
Hoover, 103 S. Ct. 2110 (1983). In Ronwin, a person who had failed the Arizona bar
examination sued the examination committee alleging that the committee had vio-
lated federal antitrust law. 686 F.2d at 694. The plaintiff alleged a scheme to restrict
competition among Arizona attorneys by grading the bar examination to admit a
predetermined number of applicants. Id at 695. For a further discussion of Ronwin,
see notes 96-100 and accompanying text infra.
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Yet, with this potential for competitive abuse and conflict between anti-
trust policy and other ethical considerations, it was not until eighty-five
years after the passage of the Sherman Act 8 that the United States Supreme
Court in Goldfarb v. irginia State Bar9 conclusively determined that antitrust
law applies to the "learned professions." 10 The Goldfarb decision, however,
created many questions concerning how professionals are to be treated under
the antitrust laws.
This comment will discuss the status of the professions under the anti-
trust laws prior to the Goldfarb decision, Goldfarb's impact on the professions
and cases subsequent to Goldfarb that have attempted to further resolve the
professions' status under the antitrust laws. In addition, this comment will
discuss the "state action" doctrine, the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemp-
tion,I' and associational liability as these concepts relate to the professions.
In so doing, this comment endeavors to shed light on the professions' current
status under the antitrust laws and to demonstrate how these laws will be
applied to professional activities in the future.
II. THE PROFESSIONS: UNLIKELY TARGETS OF THE SHERMAN ACT
A. The Professions Are Not Involved i'n "Trade or Commerce"
The belief that the professions were beyond the jurisdiction of the Sher-
man Act was based in part on an analysis of the language of the Act. Al-
though this language is broad in scope, 12 it does require that "trade or
commerce" be restrained in order for the Act to be violated.' 3 It was the
idea that professionals were not involved in "trade or commerce" that initi-
ated the belief that the Sherman Act did not encompass the professions.' 4
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). The Sherman Act is the basic antitrust legislation in
the United States; most substantive antitrust law derives from the concepts contained
in sections 1 and 2 of the Act. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTI-
TRUST § 3, at 13 (1977). These sections provide in pertinent part as follows:
Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...
Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. ...
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982).
9. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
10. d. at 788.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982).
12. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). In Northern
Pacfic, the Court observed, "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as
the rule of trade." Id. at 4-5.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). For the text of the pertinent parts of §§ 1 and 2 of
the Act, see note 8 supra.
14. The genesis of the belief that the "learned professions" were not involved in
1983-841
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In the years following the passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme
Court did not directly address the issue of whether professionals were in-
volved in trade or commerce.15 However, in several cases not directly con-
cerned with the professions, the Supreme Court implied that the professions
were not involved in such an activity.1 6 Further, several lower federal
courts, when squarely faced with this issue, held that the professions were not
engaged in trade or commerce and thus were not within the jurisdiction of
the Sherman Act.
17
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act also require that the alleged re-
straint of trade occur in interstate trade or commerce. la In the years immedi-
trade is found in an opinion witten by Justice Story. See The Schooner Nymph, 18 F.
Cas. 506 (C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388). In The Schooner Nymph, a decision which
preceded the Sherman Act by 60 years, Justice Story ruled that the word "trade" as
used in a 1793 coasting and fishery act encompassed employment in mackerel fisher-
ies. 18 F. Cas. at 507 (citing Coasting and Fishery Act, ch. 52, § 32, 1 Stat. 316
(1793)). However, in determining that such employment constituted a "trade," Jus-
tice Story stated as follows: "Wherever any occupation, employment, or business is
carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in
the learned professions , it is constantly called a trade." Id (emphasis added).
This definition of trade was later cited with approval in construing the prohibi-
tion against restraints of trade in the territories and the District of Columbia con-
tained in § 3 of the Sherman Act. See Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States,
286 U.S. 427, 437 (1932) (business of cleaning, dyeing and renovating wearing ap-
parel constitutes trade within the meaning of § 3 of the Sherman Act). However,
Atlantic Cleaners did not address whether the professions were trades.
For additional discussion of the "learned professions" exclusion from Sherman
Act liability, see Little & Rush, Resolving the Conflict Between Professional Ethics Opinions
andAntitrust Laws, 15 GA. L. REV. 341, 246-48 (1981). See also Bauer, supra note 1, at
571-82; Comment, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of Per Se
Rules Under the Sherman Act, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REV. 387, 393-96 (1978).
15. The Goldfarb case was the first Supreme Court decision to address directly
the issue of whether the practice of the "learned professions" comes within the Sher-
man Act. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 786 n.15.
16. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931) ("medical practitioners fol-
low a profession and not a trade); Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Pro-
fessional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) ("a firm of lawyers sending out a
member to argue a case . . . does not engage in . . .commerce because the lawyer
• ..goes to another State"); The Schooner Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506, 507 (C.C.D. Me.
1834) (No. 10,388).
17. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974)(practice
of law is not trade or commerce), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Riggall v. Washington
County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957) (practice of medicine is not trade
or commerce), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958); United States v. American Medical
Ass'n, 28 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1939), rev'd, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 644 (1940).
18. For the relevant portions of the text of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, see
note 8 supra.
Two distinct sub-issues arise when the problem of whether an activity constitutes
"trade or commerce" under the first two sections of the Sherman Act is examined. L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 8, § 233, at 708. The first issue is constitutional in scope and
involves a determination of whether the activity in question constitutes "commerce"
within the meaning of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Id
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The second question is one of statutory construction
and involves a determination of whether the activity constitutes "trade or commerce"
[Vol. 29: p. 115
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ately following the passage of the Act, the Supreme Court interpreted this
interstate commerce requirement in such a fashion that most professional
activities would not be deemed to affect interstate commerce.' 9 For exam-
ple, in dicta contained in the 1922 decision of Federal Baseball Club of Balti-
more, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,20 Justice Holmes
within the meaning of the Sherman Act. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 8, § 233, at 708.
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress went as far as was constitutionally
permissible in passing the Act and, therefore, most activities which are in "com-
merce" in a constitutional sense also constitute "trade or commerce" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act. Id. § 233, at 709-10. For cases construing the Sherman
Act to embody the full scope of congressional power under the commerce clause, see,
e.g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) ("Congress, in
passing the Sherman Act, left no area of its constitutional power unoccupied");
United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944) (Con-
gress intended to expend its full power in limiting interstate restraints of trade); Ras-
mussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Congress [in
passing the Sherman Act] wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional
power") (quoting Southeastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 558-59); Las Vegas Merchant
Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739 (9th Cir. 1954) ("In the enact-
ment of the Sherman Act Congress exercised its full power over interstate com-
merce"). For a discussion of the relationship between the jurisdictional requirements
of the commerce clause and the Sherman Act, see Comment, The Confusing World of
Interstate Commerce andJurtsdictton Under the Sherman Act-A Look at the Development and
Future of the Currently EmployedJurisdictional Tests, 21 VILL. L. REv. 721 (1976); Note,
Portrait of the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 323 (1974).
19. Cf United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895). InE.C Knight
Co., the first antitrust case to reach the Supreme Court, the Court held there was no
federal jurisdiction over a firm's alleged monopolization of sugar refining because
"manufacturing" was deemed a wholly local activity. Id. This was so, even though
the raw materials needed to produce the finished product and the finished product
itself were shipped in and out of the state. Id at 17. Because in most cases the
services rendered by a professional will have been wholly performed within one state,
an argument could have been made under Kntght that these services were not in
trade or commerce, despite the fact that they may have had a substantial effect on it.
The reaches of the commerce clause and the Sherman Act, were subsequently
broadened through judicial interpretation. See Swift &Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
375 (1905) (price-fixing agreement among local meat dealers was within the Act's
jurisdiction because it was "aimed" at the flow of interstate commerce); Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (price-fixing agreement among
six iron pipe manufacturers in several states fell within the Act's jurisdiction because
the combination affected national distribution). Later cases would also discredit the
Knight rationale as arbitrarily distinguishing manufacturing from interstate com-
merce. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 229-35 (1948); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 169 (1931);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1911). However, despite the
retreat from the view that manufacturing was a purely intrastate activity, there re-
mained considerable question whether professional activities occurred in interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
20. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). In Federal Baseball Club, the Supreme Court was faced
with the issue of whether the business of professional baseball, in which teams trav-
elled to different states for games, was within interstate commerce. Id. at 208. Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, found that it was not so engaged. Id. Justice Holmes
stated that "personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce."
Id. at 209. The fact that the team travelled across state lines to play games was
1983-84]
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indicated that a law firm did not engage in interstate commerce by sending
one of its lawyers to another state to argue a case. 2' The Supreme Court had
thus planted the seeds for a belief that the professions would not be subject
to antitrust scrutiny.
B. The "State Action" Doctrtne: A Potential Shield for Professional Activit;' From
Antitrust Ltabith,
The belief that the professions were beyond the jurisdiction of the Sher-
man Act drew further support from the so-called "state action" doctrine,
formulated by the Supreme Court in several cases, 2 2 culminating in the 1943
decision of Parker v. Brown.23 In Parker, the Court held, the Sherman Act was
not meant "to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature."' 24 This doctrine was thought to be particularly pertinent
considered a "mere incident" and "not the essential thing." Id. (citing Hooper v.
California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895)).
21. Id at 209.
22. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904) (state statute which limited pilotage
business to licensed pilots is not violative of the Sherman Act); Lowenstein v. Evans,
69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895) (state liquor monopoly does not violate Sherman Act).
23. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Parker Court considered whether a marketing pro-
gram under the California Agricultural Prorate Act was in conflict with the Sherman
Act. Id at 344. The California statute regulated the marketing of raisin crops grown
within the state, most of which ultimately entered interstate commerce. Id. at 345-
48. The statute authorized the establishment of marketing programs which restricted
competition among growers and maintained market prices. Id. at 346. Under the
statutory scheme, growers would petition for the establishment of a private market-
ing plan for a commodity within a defined production zone. Id. The Commission,
after hearings, would select a committee to formulate a plan if it found that the
program would prevent agricultural waste and would not permit producers to reap
unreasonable profits. Id. The Commission was authorized to approve proposed
plans after hearings if it found that the program was designed to carry out the objec-
tives of the Act. Id at 347. A producer and packer of raisins in California challenged
the scheme as invalid under the commerce clause of the Constitution, the Sherman
Act, and a federal statute. Id at 348-49.
24. Id at 350-51. The Court saw no indication in the language of the Sherman
Act or in its legislative history that Congress had intended the Act to apply to state
action. Id The Court pointed out that §§ 1 and 2 of the Act refer to "persons" who
violate its provisions. Id at 351. See note 8 supra for the text of §§ 1-2. The Court
noted that § 7 of the Act defines "persons" to "include corporations and associa-
tions," but no mention is made of states. 317 U.S. at 351. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
The Court did not wish to attribute to Congress an intent to limit the states' sover-
eignty unless expressly manifested. 317 U.S. at 351.
The Court also stated that the Sherman Act would not apply to "officers or
agents" of a state acting under the discretion of the state's legislature. Id. at 350-51.
The Court, however, limited this principle by noting that "a state does not give im-
munity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by
declaring that their action is lawful." id at 351 (citing Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-47 (1904)). The Court also implied that a state
or municipality may not participate "in a private agreement or combination by
others for restraint of trade." 317 U.S. at 351-52 (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.
United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941)). For a further discussion of the origin and im-
pact of the Parker v. Brown doctrine, see Handier, The Current Attack on the Parker v.
Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1976).
[Vol. 29: p. 115
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to the professions since their activities are often heavily regulated by the
states. Therefore, actions taken pursuant to state regulations could be
viewed as "state actions," immune from antitrust liability.
25
C. The McCarran-Ferguson Act." A Polential Shield for Professional Activi'ty from
Antitrust Liability
The professional was given further cause for hope that his activities
were not covered by the antitrust laws with the passage of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. Enacted in 1945, the McCarran-Ferguson Act provided for a
limited federal antitrust exemption for the insurance industry. 26 Although
25. 317 U.S. at 350-51. In 1976, the Court indicated that the state action doc-
trine protected some anticompetitive practices by the legal profession when it dis-
missed a Sherman Act attack against an Arizona State Bar Association Disciplinary
Rule which barred advertising by lawyers. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
The Court's decision was based on a determination that the state bar association had
exercised its rulemaking power as an agent of, and under the supervision of, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court. Id at 361. For a discussion of Bates, see notes 81-84 and ac-
companying text ihfra. See also Benson v. Arizona State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 673
F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1982) (dental board sufficiently supervised by state to render its
examination system immune from antitrust attack). For a discussion of Benson, see
notes 97-100 and accompanying text zhfra. For a discussion of the current status of
the state action doctrine as applied to the professions, see notes 80-92 and accompa-
nying text imfra. For a general discussion of the relationship of the Parker doctrine to
state regulation of professions, see Bauer, supra note 1, at 598-601. For a discussion of
the state action doctrine as a defense against federal antitrust law in general, see
Little & Rush, supra note 14, at 357-64; Simmons & Fornaciare, State Regulativn as an
Antitrust Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 61
(1974).
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982). The Act provides in relevant part as follows:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation
by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest,
and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to im-
pose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several
States.
Id. § 1011.
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regula-
tion or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business,
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided,
That . . . the Clayton Act, and . . . Federal Trade Commission Act . . .
shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such busi-
ness is not regulated by State Law.
Id. § 1012 (emphasis in original) The Act further States that "[n]othing contained in
this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to
boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation." Id.
§ 1013(b).
Prior to the passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court had stated that
"[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce." Paul v. Virginia,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868). This led to a widespread belief that the insurance
business was beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust
Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refing the Rule of
1983-84]
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the Act specifically exempted insurance industry, individuals or organiza-
tions, other lines of work were able to obtain antitrust immunity under the
Act when they were doing business with an insurance company. 27 The Mc-
Carran Act proved important to professionals, especially those involved in
providing health-related services, because there professionals were often re-
imbursed by insurance companies for services rendered. 28 In addition, pro-
fessionals often worked closely with insurance companies in determining the
standards for reimbursement. These activities were thought to be exempt
from antitrust liability.
29
Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265, 269-70 (1979). This belief was, however, shattered
in 1944, when the Supreme Court held that Congressional regulation of the insur-
ance business was within the reach of the commerce clause, and subject to federal
antitrust law. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944). The South-Eastern Underwriters Association (Association) was composed of
a membership of nearly 200 private stock fire insurance companies. Id at 534. The
Association and 27 individuals were charged with violating §§ 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act by fixing premium rates on fire and other types of insurance in several
states, and by attempting to monopolize those lines of insurance in those states. Id. at
534-35. The Court first rejected the defendants' contention that the business of fire
insurance was not in interstate commerce. Id at 539-53. The Court next considered
the Association's contention that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to reach
the interstate insurance business. Id. at 553. The Court concluded that Congress had
not intended to exempt the insurance industry under the "all-inclusive" scope of the
Sherman Act. Id at 560. The Court also rejected the argument that if the Sherman
Act were held applicable, much beneficial state insurance regulation, which was
based on the theory that "unrestricted competition in insurance results in financial
chaos and public injury," would be destroyed. Id. at 561. The Court found this
argument to be exaggerated, noting that few states allowed private companies with-
out state supervision to fix insurance rates. Id. at 562.
Congress swiftly responded to South-Eastern U'nderwriters by passing the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act which provided a federal antitrust exemption to state-regulated
insurance companies. See Sullivan & Wiley, supra, at 270.
27. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(agreement between insurer and auto repair shops, allegedly fixing hourly labor rates
paid by repair shops, held to be within McCarran-Ferguson Act exemptions absent
an illegal boycott), vacated, 440 U.S. 942 (1979); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land
Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (actions by insurance companies and
rating organizations to set fees for services to sellers of real estate held to be within the
McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 361 F. Supp.
774 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (agreement between hospitals and Blue Cross which resulted in
charging Blue Cross policyholders 14% less for hospital services, held to be within the
McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption).
28. The McCarran Act exemption was utilized frequently by professions provid-
ing medical services. See, e.g., United Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119
(1982); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). For a
discussion of Pireno, see notes 111-16 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of
Royal Drug, see notes 104-10 and accompanying text infta.
29. The domination of insurance boards by physicians and other suppliers of
health-care services has been generally said to result in a rapid escalation of health-
care costs to the detriment of consumers. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal
Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 232 n.40 (1979) (citing Skyrocketing Health Care Costs. The Role
of Bule Shield, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 4-34 (1978) (remarks
of Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission)). One study showed
[Vol. 29: p. 115
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III. THE FIRST BLOW: THE SUPREME COURT INDICATES THAT
PROFESSIONAL IMMUNITY FROM THE SHERMAN ACT IS NOT
COMPLETE
If one adhered to the view that the professions were not engaged in
interstate trade or commerce, and followed the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the state action doctrine and the McCarran Act exemption, a profes-
sional could be confident that the Sherman Act did not apply to his
activities. 30 The Supreme Court, however, eroded some of this confidence in
the 1943 case of American MedicalAssocialion v. UnitedSlates.3 1 In this case, the
American Medical Association (AMA) and certain individuals were charged
with violating section 3 of the Sherman Act 32 by obstructing the operations
of Group Health Associates, Inc. (Group Health), a non-profit corporation
which provided medical services on a risk-sharing pre-payment basis. 33 The
AMA asserted at the trial level that neither the practice of medicine nor the
business of Group Health constituted trade within the meaning of section 3
of the Sherman Act.34 Although the Supreme Court expressly declined to
that Bule Shield payments to doctors were 16% higher in areas where doctors selected
Blue Shield board members than in areas where they did not. Wall St. J., Nov. 21,
1979, at 3, col. 4.
30. For a discussion of the various ways that the professions were protected from
the Sherman Act, see notes 20-37 supra.
31. 317 U.S. 519 (1943), affg, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940)).
32. Section 3 of the Sherman Act states in pertinent part as follows:
Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of
the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any
such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories
and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations,
or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign na-
tions, is declared illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
33. 317 U.S. at 526. Group Health was formed by government employees in
order to provide medical care, including hospitalization. Id. Group Health sought to
accomplish this end by employing physicians on a full-time salary basis and having
hospital facilities available to participants covered by their plan. Id This plan alleg-
edly violated the AMA's code of ethics. Id at 526-27. The AMA, prompted by a fear
of increased competition among physicians, adopted a policy in opposition to risk-
sharing prepayment plans for medical services. See United States v. American Medi-
cal Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 707 (D.C. Cir.),cer. denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940). The defend-
ants in AMA were charged with conspiring to coerce physicians to refuse employment
with Group Health, restraining physicians from consulting with Group Health's
physicians, and depriving Group Health of hospital facilities for its patients. 317
U.S. at 527.
The indictment of the defendants was based upon § 3 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits restraints of trade or commerce within the District of Columbia. Id.
at 526. Because all of Group Health's activities took place within the District, there
was no need to establish that the activities occurred in interstate commerce. d See
15 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
34. 317 U.S. at 527. The trial court had sustained a demurrer to the indictment
on these grounds. Id. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the
case. Id Upon remand, a jury found petitioners guilty as charged. Id. The court of
appeals affirmed the judgment. Id
1983-84]
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decide whether the practice of medicine constituted trade, it ruled that
Group Health was engaged in trade or business, despite the cooperative na-
ture of their enterprise. 35 The Court further held that because section 3 of
the Sherman Act was applicable to "any person" violating its strictures, the
defendants' status as physicians did not render them immune from antitrust
liability.
3 6
Seven years later, the Supreme Court further eroded professionals' con-
fidence concerning their status under the Sherman Act when it found that
personal services could constitute "trade" within the meaning of the Sher-
man Act. In United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards,37 the
Court held that the activities of a real estate broker were subject to the stric-
tures of the Sherman Act, despite the fact that these activities involved the
sale of personal services, rather than the sale of commodities. 38 Justice Jack-
son, in a dissenting opinion, foreshadowed the partial impact of the majority
opinion on professionals when he stated as follows: "I am not persuaded that
fixing uniform fees for the broker's labor is more offensive to the antitrust
law than fixing uniform fees for the labor of a lawyer, a doctor, a carpenter,
or a plumber. '39 Although Real Estate Boards did not involve professional
35. Id. at 528. The Court's determination that Group Health's activities fell
within the sphere of business was influenced by several findings:
[Group Health's] corporate activity is the consummation of the co-operative
effort of its members to obtain for themselves and their families medical
service and hospitalization on a risk-sharing prepayment basis. The corpo-
ration collects its funds from members. With these funds physicians are
employed and hospitalization procured on behalf of members and their
dependents.
Id
36. Id. at 528-29. The court stated that it was immaterial that the defendants
were physicians, if the purpose and effect of their conspiracy was to obstruct and
restrain the business of Group Health. Id at 528. One commentator has noted that
the AMA decision is significant because it shifted the focus from whether the defend-
ants were engaged in trade or commerce to whether the object of the restraint was so
involved. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 576.
37. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
38. Id. at 490. In Real Estate Boards, members of the Washington Real Estate
Board were charged with conspiring to fix commission rates for the use of their serv-
ices in real estate transactions in the District of Columbia. Id. at 487. As in AMA,
this action was brought under § 3 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits restraint of
trade in the District of Columbia. Id For the relevant text of § 3 of the Sherman
Act, see note 33 supra.
Although the holding of the Court in Real Estate Boards applied only to § 3,
language in the opinion indicated that the Court's broader use of the term "trade"
applied to the entire Sherman Act. Id at 491-92. The Court stated that "we would
be contracting the scope of the concept of 'trade,' as used in the phrase 'restraint of
trade,' in a precedent-breaking manner if we carved out an exemption for real estate
brokers." Id at 492.
39. Id at 496 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson argued in dissent that
the antitrust laws should not be applied to a real estate broker. Id Justice Jackson
implied that, for antitrust purposes, the services provided by a real estate broker
could not be distinguished from those provided by "professionals." Id. He stated,
"Services of the real estate broker, if not strictly fiduciary, are at least those of a
trusted agent and, oftentimes, advisory as to values and procedures." Id
[Vol. 29: p. 115
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services, and the Court specifically stated that they were not addressing the
question of whether professional services constituted "trade," the profes-
sional could no longer be assured that "trade" would be so narrowly con-
strued as to preclude professional services.
40
Although the Court's opinion in American Medical Assoctation and Real
Estate Boards suggested that some activities of professionals were within the
jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court was still sending out
mixed signals as to how professionals were to be treated under the Act. 41 In
United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 4 2 the Court observed in dicta that
the ethical considerations of a patient-physician relationship are quite differ-
ent from those prevailing in commercial matters. 43 The Court noted that
the competition of the business world "may be demoralizing to the ethical
standard of a profession."'44 The case involved a suit brought by the United
States government against several medical societies in Oregon, alleging a
conspiracy to restrain competition in the business of providing prepaid medi-
cal care. 45 However, the Supreme Court held that because the government
40. 339 U.S. at 490-92.
41. In Real Estate Boards, the Supreme Court approved a broad reading of the
term "trade" in the Sherman Act. 339 U.S. at 491 (citing The Schooner Nymph, 18
F. Cas. 506 (C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388)). However, the Court declined to adopt
or reject the court of appeals' view that the term "trade" included " 'all occupations
in which men are engaged for a livelihood.' " 339 U.S. at 491-92 (citing United
States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1940)). In American
Medical Ass'n, the District of Columbia Circuit had held that the term "trade" as
used in the phrase "restraint of trade" included the medical profession. 110 F.2d at
710. Rather than venture an opinion as to the correctness of the applicability of the
term "trade" to the professions, the Court in Real Estate Boards concluded that
whatever the term "trade" meant, it included the real estate brokerage business. Id
at 492.
Similarly, in AMZA the-Supreme Court refused to address the status of profession-
als under the Sherman Act. 317 U.S. at 528. Two years after the Real Estate Boards
decision, the Court again declined to provide explicit guidance on the applicability of
the Sherman Act to the professions. See United States v. Oregon State Medical
Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952).
42. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
43. Id. at 336.
44. Id (citing Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608
(1935)).' Semler did not involve the antitrust laws, but rather, a 1933 Oregon statute
which prohibited advertising by dentists. Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Ex-
aminers 15, 294 U.S. 608, 608-09 (1935). Semler, a dentist who had advertised his
services, sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute, alleging that it violated the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and impaired the
obligation of contracts in violation of the contracts clause of the United States Con-
stitution. Id at 609. In upholding the statute-against these challenges, the Court
stated that "the community is concerned in providing safeguards not only against
deception, but against practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by
forcing its members into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities
of the least scrupulous." Id at 612.
45. 343 U.S. at 328-30. In 1936, several organizations of doctors in Oregon were
opposed to prepaid medical care. Id. at 329. The physicians were concerned it
would divert patients from independent practitioners. Id However, in 1941, there
was an abrupt change of mind by the organized medical profession in Oregon con-
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had failed to prove this conspiracy, it was unnecessary to resolve the question
of whether such a conspiracy would have violated the antitrust laws.
46
IV. Goldfarb v. Virgirna State Bar: THE SUPREME COURT DEEMS THE
SHERMAN ACT APPLIES TO THE PROFESSIONS
In 1975, the Supreme Court squarely held that the terms "trade or com-
merce" as used in the Sherman Act encompassed the professions. In Goldfarb
v. Virginia Stale Bar, a husband and wife, in connection with the purchase of
a new home, were required to have a title examination performed by a law-
yer.47 They were unable to find a lawyer who would perform this service for
less than the fee listed in a "minimum fee schedule" that had been adopted
by the county bar association and enforced by the state bar association.
48
The couple brought suit against the state and county bar associations alleg-
ing that the operation of the minimum fee schedule in this context resulted
in an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
cerning prepaid medical care. Id The physicians were apparently convinced that
the public demanded and was entitled to the protection provided by prepaid medical
services. Id The organized physicians decided to get into the business themselves by
rendering such a service on a non-profit basis. Id. at 329-30. This case arose out of
allegations that the defendant physicians, their professional organizations and their
prepaid medical care company conspired to restrain and monopolize the business of
providing prepaid care in Oregon. Id at 330.
46. 343 U.S. at 336. As in both AMA and RealEs/ale Boards, the Supreme Court
was able to avoid deciding the issue of whether the professions' actions were trade or
commerce subject to the Sherman Act.
47. 421 U.S. 773, 775 (1975). The financing agency required the Goldfarbs to
obtain title insurance in order for them to obtain financing for the purchase of their
home. Id As a practical matter, purchasers of property were required to obtain a
title examination and only a member of the Virgina State Bar could perform that
service. Id (footnote omitted).
48. 421 U.S. at 776. The fee schedule adopted by the county bar association
was a list of recommended minimum prices for common legal services. Id at 776. In
1969, the state bar had published a fee-schedule report which stated that lawyers
"should feel free to charge more than the recommended fees. " Id at 777 n.4 (emphasis in
original). Although the report stated that county bar associations were not bound by
the fee schedule, the Fairfax County Bar Association adopted a fee schedule similar
to the one suggested by the state bar association. Id. at 777 n.4.
The lawyer whom the Goldfarbs initially contacted told them that it was his
policy to keep his charges for a title examination in line with the minimum fee sched-
ule of the county, which called for a fee of one percent of the value of the property to
be purchased. Id at 776. The Goldfarbs sent letters to 36 other lawyers in the
county inquiring about fees. Id. Nineteen responded and none indicated that they
would perform the title examination for less than the fixed rate. Id Several lawyers
responded that they knew of no lawyers who would do so. Id.
Although the Fairfax County Bar Association, which published the fee schedule,
was a voluntary association and had no formal power to enforce the schedule, en-
forcement was provided through the state bar. Id at 776-78. The state bar, while
never having taken any formal disciplinary action to compel compliance with fee
schedules, had published reports condoning the fee schedule and issued two ethical
opinions indicating fee schedules "cannot be ignored." Id. One ethical opinion stated
that a lawyer who habitually charges lower than the fee schedule recommended by
the local bar association would be presumed guilty of misconduct. Id at 777-78.
(Vol. 29: p. 115
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The Court, in finding that the lawyers were not immune from Sherman
Act liability, stated that Congress never intended a sweeping exclusion for
the professions, but rather attempted broad coverage for anyone in business
whose activities might restrain interstate commerce. 50 The Court went on to
state that "[i]n the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities of
lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and that an-
ticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce." 5'
In finding that the availability of title examinations has a substantial
affect on interstate commerce, the Court adopted the district court's observa-
tion that a significant portion of the funds used for financing the purchase of
homes in the county came from outside the state, thus making the purchase
of a home an interstate transaction. 52 The Court stated that the title exami-
nation was an integral part of the purchase of a home, and a restraint of this
service "may substantially affect commerce for Sherman Act purposes."
'53
However, in a cautionary footnote, the Court stated that it would be
49. Id at 775. The Goldfarbs brought a class action suit, seeking damages and
injunctive relief. Id at 778.
50. Id at 786-88. The Court stated that there was no explicit exemption in the
Act nor was there anything contained in the legislative history to support the conten-
tion that professionals were exempt from § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 786. The
Court found that the nature of an occupation, in itself, does not provide relief from
the Sherman Act. Id at 787 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7
(1945)). The Court also found that the public service aspect of professions was not
controlling in determining whether § 1 of the Sherman Act includes professions. Id
(citing Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. at 489). The Court also found that Congress in-
tended § I to be as broad as possible. Id (citingSouth-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at
553). In addition, the Court stated there was a "heavy presumption against implicit
exemptions." Id (citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-
51 (1963); California v. Federal Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)).
The Court found that a title examination is a service and since money is received
for this service, it constituted "commerce" in the most common usage of the word.
Id at 787-88. The Court stated that it was "no disparagement of the practice of law
as a profession to acknowledge that it has this business aspect." Id
As to the earlier Supreme Court cases which indicated that professions were not
involved in trade or commerce, the Court stated these were simply "passing refer-
ences in cases concerned with other issues."Id at 786 n. 15 (citing Real Estate Boards,
339 U.S. at 490; Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 426, 436
(1932); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (193 1); Federal Baseball Club, 259 U.S.
at 209). The Court went on to state that it had not previously attempted to decide
whether the practice of a learned profession was within § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id
at 785 n.15.
51. Id at 788.
52. Id at 783. In addition to a significant portion of the loans coming from
outside the state, many of the loans were guaranteed by the United States Veterans
Administration and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Id.
53. Id at 784-85. The Court reasoned that because a title examination was nec-
essary to assure a lender that the borrower has a valid title in a real estate purchase,
the title examination was an integral part of the transaction. 1d at 784. The Court
found this to be the necessary connection between the interstate transaction and the
restraint of trade. Id at 783-84. The Court stated that given the large volume of
commerce involved, and the inseparability of the title examination from the inter-
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unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust
concepts which originated in other areas.54 The Court went on to state that
state aspects of real estate transactions, interstate commerce was sufficiently affected.
Id at 785.
The Court rejected the argument that because there was no showing that home
buyers were discouraged from purchasing homes by the fixing of fees for title exami-
nation, there was no effect on interstate commerce. Id. The Court stated that to
accept this argument would be to concede that the magnitude of the effect controls
the analysis. Id The Court noted that its cases "have shown that, once effect is
shown, no specific magnitude need be proved." Id (citing United States v. McKes-
son & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 310 (1956)). The Court also rejected the assertion
that it was necessary to prove that the fee schedule actually increased fees. Id The
Court stated that it was sufficient to prove that "the fee schedule fixed fees and thus
'deprive[d] purchasers or consumers of the advantages which they derive from free
competition.'" Id (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501 (1940)).
The Goldfarb Court's expansive view of what is considered interstate commerce
for Sherman Act purposes is not surprising when considered in conjunction with the
Court's modern view of what constitutes interstate commerce for constitutional com-
merce clause analysis. For discussion of the relationship between the Sherman Act
and the commerce clause of the United States Constitution concerning what consti-
tutes "interstate commerce," see note 19 supra. Modern commerce clause cases have
given a very broad meaning to the term interstate commerce. See, e.g., Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In Wickard, the Supreme Court found that a wheat
farmer who grew wheat for his own on-farm consumption affected the total national
sale and supply of wheat and thus could be subject to a production quota as part of
Congress' constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. Id
There are now two jurisdictional tests to determine whether an activity consti-
tutes interstate commerce for purposes of antitrust analysis. Sullivan, supra note 8,
§ 233a, at 709. The first is whether the activity is "in" or "in the flow of" interstate
commerce. Id Once an activity is determined to be in interstate commerce, the ex-
tent of its effect is not considered. Id § 233a, at 709-10. The second test inquires
whether the activity has a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. Id. § 233a, at
710. To have a substantial effect on commerce, there must be a logical, causal con-
nection between the activity and the flow of interstate commerce, and the flow must
be affected in some substantial way. Id.
In Goldfarb, although the actual fixing of fees was not "in" or "in the flow" of
interstate commerce, the fixing of fees did substantially affect the purchase of real
estate, which was in the flow of interstate commerce. 421 U.S. at 785. For further
discussions of interstate commerce under the Sherman Act, see generally Eiger, The
Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED. B.J. 282 (1965); Kallis, Local
Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DUKE L.J. 236; Krotinger, The "Essentially Local"
Doctrine and Section I of the Sherman Act, 15 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 66 (1963). See also
Bauer, supra note 1, at 592-98.
54. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17. The Court cautioned as follows:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particu-
lar restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice
of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The pub-
lic service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the
Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no
view on other other situation than the one with which we are confronted
today.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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a particular practice which would violate the Sherman Act in one context
may have to be treated differently in a professional context. 55 Yet, the Court
did not offer any guidance as to when these situations might occur, or what
they might be.
56
In Goldfarb, the Court also considered whether the bar associations' ac-
tivities were outside the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act by operation of the
"state action" doctrine set forth in Parker v. Brown.57 The bar associations in
Goldfarb had argued that since the Virginia legislature had authorized Vir-
ginia's highest state court to regulate the practice of law, and that court had
in turn adopted rules permitting use of a fee schedule, the bar associations'
adoption of such schedules, constituted state action. 58 In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court stated that the state's highest court would had to have man-
dated the use of these fee schedules for their use to be considered state action;




56. Id. For a discussion of the effects of the Goldfarb footnote on later cases, see
notes 73-76 and accompanying text thfra.
57. 421 U.S. at 780. For a discussion of Parker and its formulation of the state
action doctrine, see notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
58. 421 U.S. at 788-90. The relevant Virginia statute which authorized Vir-
ginia's highest state court to regulate the practice of law provided as follows:
The Supreme Court of Appeals may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt,
promulgate and amend rules and regulations:
(a) Defining the practice of law.
(b) Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of
attorneys at law and a code of judicial ethics.
(c) Prescribing procedure for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring
attorneys at law.
Id at 789 n.18 (quoting VA. CODE § 54-48 (1972)).
The Supreme Court of Virginia, which is Virginia's highest state court, had
adopted ethical codes which dealt in part with fees. 421 U.S. at 789. Under the
then-most current rules, there were eight factors that the Court directed to be consid-
ered in setting a fee. Id at 789 n.9. One of these factors used in the fee-setting
process was the fee customarily charged in that area for similar legal services. Id
(citing VIRGINIA CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-106, 211 Va. 295, 313
(1970)).
The state bar asserted that by issuing the fee schedules, they were simply a state
agency implementing the fee provisions set forth in the ethical codes by the Virginia
Supreme Court. Id at 789-90. The county bar, although a voluntary association,
claimed that the actions of the state bar "prompted" it to issue fee schedules and,
therefore, its actions should also be considered state action for Sherman Act purposes.
Id at 790.
59. Id at 790-91. The Court stated that the threshold inquiry to determine if an
anticompetitive activity is state action under the Sherman Act is whether the activity
is "required by the State acting as sovereign." Id at 790. (citations omitted). The
Court found that it did not have to go beyond this threshold inquiry "because it
cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme Court Rules
required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent." Id at 790. The Court
stated that there was no Virginia statute that required the state bar association to
promulgate a fee schedule, and in fact, there was no state law referring to fees what-
soever. Id. Although the supreme court's ethical codes mentioned advisory fee sched-
ules, it did not direct the bar associations to supply them or require a minimum fee
1983-84]
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V. POST-GOLDFARB: ARE THE PROFESSIONS ENTITLED TO
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT?
A. The Professions and the Rule of Reason
The Goldfarb decision did not provide any insight on the type of analysis
to be used in determining whether professional activities violate the antitrust
laws. In assessing activities which may potentially violate the Sherman Act,
courts generally utilize either the "rule of reason analysis" or the "per se doc-
trine." 60 Under the rule of reason analysis, a court will analyze all the factors
relevant to the activities at issue to decide whether the activities operate to
diminish competition. 6 1 If competition is found to be diminished, the activi-
ties will be held to unreasonably restrain trade and thus violate the Sherman
Act.62 Soon after Goldfarb, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether a professional society could justify its actions by asserting that under
the rule of reason its anticompetitive actions were necessary to protect the
public welfare.
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,63 the National
Society of Professional Engineers (Society) attempted to defend its policy of
which the bar associations had set. Id. The Court stated that it was not enough that
state action "prompted" anticompetitive conduct; rather, the state must compel the
conduct. Id. at 791.
60. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 8, § 63, at 166. The rule of reason analysis
originated in a 1911 case which involved allegations that the Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey engaged with others to fix the price of oil. See Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). For a discussion of theperse rule, see notes 70-
81 and accompanying text infra.
61. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 8, § 65, at 173. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
literally prohibits every agreement in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). For the
relevant portion of the text of section 1, see note 8 supra. The Supreme Court has
recognized that all agreements restrain trade to some degree and has reasoned that
Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation of the word "every." See
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898).
The Court has construed the Sherman Act to prohibit only those agreements
which unreasonably restrain competition. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 60 (1911). In Standard Oil, the Court recognized that unreasonableness can be
based either on the nature or character of the contracts or on surrounding circum-
stances which give rise to the inference or presumption that the contracts were in-
tended to restrain trade. Id. at 58.
In a case decided seven years after Standard Oil, Justice Brandeis, writing for the
Court, further defined the rule of reason analysis by outlining some of the factors a
court should consider when using that analysis. Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Justice Brandeis noted that such relevant factors
included the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, the condi-
tion of the business before and after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the
restraint and its actual or probable effect, the history of the restraint, the evil believed
to exist, the reason for adopting that particular restraint as a remedy, and the pur-
pose or the end sought to be attained. Id
For further discussion of the rule of reason see E. KINTER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAW § 8.2, at 350-62 (1980); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 8, §§ 63-66, at 165-82.
62. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 8, § 65, at 172 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
63. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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prohibiting members from submitting competitive bids for engineering serv-
ices by asserting that this policy protected the public safety by maintaining
the quality of its members' services. 64 In rejecting the Society's argument
under the rule of reason, the Court stated that the Society's ban on competi-
tive bidding both prevented all customers from making price comparisons
in the initial selection of an engineer and also imposed its views of the costs
and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace.
6 5
The Court further stated that it adhered to the view expressed in Gold-
farb that the nature of professional services may differ significantly from that
of other business services. 66 However, the Court cautioned that there was no
broad exemption under the rule of reason for the professions. 67 The Court
stated that although ethical norms may be considered under the rule of rea-
son when they serve to regulate and promote competition, 68 the rule does
64. Id. at 684-85. In National Sock, of Professional Eng'rs, the government alleged
that members of the Society had agreed to abide by canons of ethics prohibiting the
submission of competitive bids for engineering services. Id at 684. Section II of the
Society's Code of Ethics stated, "The Engineer will not compete unfairly with an-
other engineer by attempting to obtain employment or advancement or professional
engagements by competitive bidding. ... Id at 683 n.3. The Society did not deny
the government's essential facts, but asserted in a rule of reason analysis that the
prohibition of competitive bidding was justified to protect the public safety. Id at
685. The Society stated that the rule against competitive bidding prevented produc-
tion of inferior work. Id at 684-85. Without this rule, awards frequently would be
made to the lowest bidder, regardless of quality. Id at 685. The Society argued that
"it would be cheaper and easier for an engineer 'to design and specify inefficient and
unnecessarily expensive structures and methods of construction.' " Id. at 684-85 (cit-
ing Brief for Appellant at 21-22). The Society claimed that this practice of awarding
bids regardless of quality would be dangerous to the public health, safety and wel-
fare. Id at 685.
65. Id. at 694-95. In discussing the rule of reason analysis, the Court quoted
with approval the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to study the
Antitrust Laws:
While Standard Oil gave the courts discretion in interpreting the word
"every" in Section 1, such discretion is confined to consideration of whether
in each case the conduct being reviewed under the Act constitutes an undue
restraint of competitive conditions, or a monopolization, or an attempt to
monopolize. This standard permits the courts to decide whether conduct is
significantly and unreasonably anticompetitive in character or effect; it
makes obsolete once prevalent arguments, such as, whether monopoly ar-
rangements would be socially preferable to competition in a particular in-
dustry, because, for example, of high fixed costs or the risks of "cutthroat"
competition or other similar unusual conditions.
Id. at 691 n.16 (quoting REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COM-
MITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 11 (1955)).
The Professional Engineers Court noted that in the free market system it is as-
sumed that competition favorably affects not only cost but all aspects of a bargain,
including quality, service, safety, and durability. Id. at 695. The Court stated that
the existence of occasional exceptions to this assumption could not justify deviations
from the statutory policy, which precluded inquiry into the merits of competition.
Id.
66. Id. at 696.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970)). In Trip-
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not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is
unreasonable. 69
B. The Professions and the Per Se Rule
Although most alleged antitrust violations are analyzed under the rule
of reason, courts have recognized certain practices as being so clearly an-
ticompetitive that they are conclusively held to be per se illegal. 7 0 The
Supreme Court's past experience with these types of practices allows it to
find these practices per se illegal without the necessity of the often long, com-
plex and expensive analysis which the rule of reason requires. 7' Both the
oh, the Third Circuit held that a marketing plan which limited the distribution of
cosmetic products to licensed beauticians and barbers rather than to the general pub-
lic was permissible because of the potentially dangerous effects of the products' use by
those not having the requisite training and skills. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425
F.2d 932, 936-37 (3d Cir. 1970). In addition, the Tripoli court found no "meaning-
ful" anticompetitive effects from the marketing plan because there was considerable
competition among wholesalers of these types of products. Id at 938-39.
In Professional Engineers, the Court noted that the Society's argument was a "far
cry" from the position advanced in cases such as Tripoli. 435 U.S. at 696. In re-
jecting the Society's attempt to argue that competition would automatically foster
deceptive practices in the engineering profession, the Court stated that "we may as-
sume that competition is not entirely conducive to ethical behavior, but that is not a
reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away with competition." Id
For a general discussion of Professional Engineers, see Note, Per Se Rule Apphed to
Ethical Canon Against Competitive Bidding, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 260 (1978).
69. 435 U.S. at 696. One commentator has noted that
the mere invocation of "ethics" as a justification for anticompetitive con-
duct will not be sufficient. It didn't work in Goldfarb or Professional Engineers
or AMA, and it won't work in the future. While it seems to be difficult for
doctors and lawyers to appreciate this point, the prevalence of self-regula-
tion is a reason for more antitrust concern, not less.
Sims, supra note 5, at 186 (emphasis in original).
70. See Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977) (footnote
omitted). Various practices have been held per se illegal. See, e.g., United States v.
Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal restraint); Fortner Enters. v. United
States Steel, 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (tying arrangement); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum price fixing); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
U.S. 29 (1960) (price maintenance combination); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycott); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangement); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593 (1951) (horizontal market division); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph F. Sea-
gram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (vertical price-maintenance agreements); Fashion
Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (artificial raising and fixing prices);
United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (horizontal price-fixing
agreements).
71. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44
(1982). Although the Court recognized that certain agreements may be invalidated
under the per se rule where those same agreements may have been proven reasonable
under a full rule of reason inquiry, the Court will tolerate this solution for the sake of
business certainty and litigation efficiency. Id. at 344 (footnote omitted). The Court
went on to state,
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the
social utility of particular commercial practices. The probability that an-
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Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have interpreted Goldfarb to
require a rule of reason analysis in situations where professionals were in-
volved, even if the same practice in a purely commercial setting would be
held per se illegal.
72
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,73 the Ninth Circuit refused
to apply the per se rule to an agreement among physicians to set maximum
fees for medical services, even though the Supreme Court had previously
found other maximum price-fixing schemes to beperse illegal.74 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that it could not find the planper se illegal because, among
other reasons, it was "uncertain about the competitive order that should ex-
ist within the health care industry pursuant to the Sherman Act as inter-
preted by the courts." 75 The court went on to state that since Goldfarb, the
parameters of professional liability under the Sherman Act are being defined
on a case-by-case basis.
76
On certiorari, however the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,
and held that the physicians' plan was per se illegal. 77 The Court reiterated
its statement in Goldfarb that the public service aspects and other features of
ticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of
those consequences must be balanced against its procompetitive conse-
quences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but aper se rule
reflected the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or im-
portant to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them.
Id. at 344 n. 16 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50
n.16 (1977)).
72. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.
1980) (ber se rule not applied to setting of maximum fees by medical society), rev'd,
457 U.S. 332 (1982); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624
F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980) (per se rule not applied to medical plans which boycott
competitors), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1982).
73. 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
74. 643 F.2d at 557. In Maricopa County, a group of licensed physicians started a
non-profit corporation which established a schedule of maximum fees that the partic-
ipating physicians agreed to charge for services rendered to patients covered by cor-
poration-approved insurance plans. Id at 554-55. The physicians could charge an
amount less than the maximum fee and could charge any fee to patients not insured
by approved plans. See Maricopa County Medical Soc), 457 U.S. at 341. Patients in-
sured by an approved plan could go to non-member physicians, but would only be
reimbursed for fees paid up to the schedule maximums. Id
75. 643 F.2d at 556. The court went on to state,
The present supply and demand functions of medical services in no way
approximate those which would exist in a purely private competitive order.
An accurate description of those functions moreover is not available. Thus,
we lack baselines by which could be measured the distance between the




77. Mancopa County MedicalSoc), 457 U.S. at 332. The Court stated that two of
its earlier decisions precluded the argument that the setting of maximum fees is not
per se illegal. Id. at 348 (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)). For a general
discussion of the impact of Maricopa on the professions, see Sims, supra note 5.
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the professions may require different treatment for professionals in some con-
texts, but further stated that the price-fixing agreement by the physicians in
the instant case was not premised on public service or ethical norms, and
therefore was to be treated as any other price-fixing agreement. 78 In re-
sponse to the Nineth Circuit's belief that it did not have sufficient experience
with the health care industry to find the plan per se illegal, the Supreme
Court stated that, with respect to price-fixing, the Sherman Act " 'establishes
one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike.' -79
C. The Professions and the State Action Doctrine
Although the Goldfarb Court recognized the possibility that the state ac-
tion doctrine might protect anticompetitive acts of professionals from the
reach of the Sherman Act, the Court provided little guidance regarding the
extent of state involvement required to invoke this protection.8 0 In subse-
quent cases, however, the Court attempted to clarify the circumstances
under which activities could constitute state action such that Sherman Act
liability is inapplicable.
First, in Bates v. State Bar,81 the Supreme Court held that a ban on ad-
78. 457 U.S. at 348-49. The Court noted that the physicians did not argue that
the quality of their professional services would be enhanced by the price restraint. Id
at 349. The claim that the maximum fee schedule would make it easier for customers
to pay their medical bills "does not distinguish the medical profession from any other
provider of goods or services." Id
79. Id. (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220
(1940)). The Court also stated that " '[tlhe elimination of so-called competitive evils
[in an industry] is no legal justification' for price-fixing agreements." Id. (quoting
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220 (1940)).
The lower federal courts have attempted to avoid the strict application of theper
se rule to professionals. For example, in Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospltal,
the Fourth Circuit analyzed under the rule of reason a group boycott and attempted
monopolization, an activity usually accorded per se treatment. Hospital Bldg. Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hospital, 691 F.2d 678, 683-87 (4th Cir. 1982). The court's rationale
in so doing was that there was statutory authorization designed to avoid duplication
of health care services by promoting planned development of health facilities. Id. at
684. The court ruled that the restraints may have been reasonable "if undertaken in
good faith and if their actual and intended effects lay within those envisioned by
specific federal legislation." Id. at 685.
80. 421 U.S. at 788-92. The Goldfarb Court did not consider the extent of state
involvement required to invoke the protection of the state action doctrine, because it
found the use of the fee schedules had not been mandated by the state. Id at 790.
For discussion of the state action doctrine, see notes 22-25 and accompanying text
supra. For an additional discussion of the state action doctrine issue in Goldfarb, see
notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
81. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Bates, two attorneys operated a "legal clinic" which
offered modest-cost legal services to persons with moderate incomes who did not
qualify for legal aid. Id. at 354. The attorneys depended on substantial volume due
to the low return on individual cases. Id After practicing in the legal clinic for two
years, the attorneys began to advertise the availability of their low-cost legal services,
in contravention of an Arizona Supreme Court disciplinary rule. Id. at 345-55 (citing
17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rule 29(a) (West Supp. 1976)). After the president of
the state bar association filed a complaint against the attorneys, a hearing was held
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vertising by attorneys did not violate the Sherman Act because it was pro-
tected by the state action doctrine.8 2 In Bates, the Court found that the state
bar association prohibition of advertising by attorneys had been directed by
the Arizona Supreme Court and was thus "'compelled by direction of the
State acting as sovereign.' ",83 The Court distinguished Bates from Goldfarb
by noting that although the action was merely permitted in Goldfarb, the
action was compelled by the state in Bates.
84
In 1980, the Supreme Court, in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association
v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc. ,85 formulated a two-part standard for immunity
under the state action doctrine.8 6 This standard required that the challenged
restraint of trade be " 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
before a special administrative committee as prescribed by Arizona Supreme Court
Rule 33. Id. at 356. The committee recommended that the attorneys be suspended
from the practice of law for not less than six months. Id. After further review, the
Board of Governors of the State Bar recommended only a one-week suspension for
each attorney. Id Subsequently, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the attorneys'
claims that the rule violated both the Sherman Act and the first amendment to the
Constitution. Id
82. Id at 359-60. The rule prohibiting advertising stated in pertinent part as
follows:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper
or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display ad-
vertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of commer-
cial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so on his behalf.
Id at 355 (quoting 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rule 29(a) (West Supp. 1976)).
Although the Court found that the prohibition of advertising did not violate the
Sherman Act, the Court held that the prohibition against advertising violated the
first amendment. 433 U.S. at 363 & 384.
83. Id. at 359-60 (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791). The Court noted that the
Arizona State Constitution gives the state supreme court the ultimate authority over
the state's power concerning the practice of law. Id at 360 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art.
III). Utilizing that constitutional authority, the Arizona Supreme Court adopted the
rules prohibiting advertising. Id
84. Id. at 359-60. For a discussion of why the Supreme Court ruled that the fee
schedule in Goldfarb was not mandated by the state, see notes 58-59 and accompany-
ing text supra.
85. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
86. Id at 105. These standards were based on prior decisions of the Supreme
Court. See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 340 (1978);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). For a discussion of Parker, see notes 25-27 and
accompanying text supra. Louisiana Power & Light involved a group of Louisiana cit-
ies which owned and operated electric utility systems pursuant to a state law. 435
U.S. at 391. The group brought an antitrust action against several investor-owned
electric service utilities against which the city systems competed outside the city lim-
its. Id at 391-92. An investor-owned system counterclaimed, alleging that the city-
owned systems were guilty of various antitrust offenses. Id at 392. The plaintiff
cities moved to dismiss the counterclaims on the ground that the "state action" doc-
trine, as formulated in Parker, rendered federal antitrust laws inapplicable to them.
Id The district court granted the city's motion, but the court of appeals reversed.
Id. at 392-93. In affirming the decision of the Fifth Circuit, the Court refused to find
that the Parker "state action" exception automatically applied to cities or subdivisions
of the state. Id at 408.
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policy' " and "be 'actively supervised' by the State itself."'8 7 In Midca/, a
California statute required wine producers and wholesalers to file with the
state fair trade contracts or price schedules, and prohibited the sale of wine
to retailers at other than the price set by schedule or contract. 88 A whole-
saler who had sold wine for less than the price set by a price schedule de-
fended his actions by asserting that the wine pricing scheme violated the
Sherman Act.8 9 The Court agreed with the wholesaler's assertion that the
state action exemption was inapplicable, stating that although the first
prong of the test had been met because the legislative policy was clear in
purpose, the second prong had not been met because the state neither estab-
lished the prices nor reviewed the reasonableness of the price schedules. 90
This minimum involvement by the state was deemed insufficient to justify
"what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 9 1
In Ronwtn v. State Bar,92 the Ninth Circuit analyzed the state action doc-
trine in a manner which narrowly limited the circumstances under which an
agency could base its claim of antitrust immunity upon delegation of author-
ity from the state. In Ronwtin, a prospective attorney who had failed the
Arizona bar examination challenged the examination grading procedures as
87. 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 410 (1975)).
88. Id at 99 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 24866(b), 24866(c) & 24862
(West Supp. 1980)). Under this statute, a single fair trade contract or schedule sets
the terms of all wholesale transactions in a prescribed area. Id. at 99 (citing CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1980)). State regulations
also provided that the wine prices posted by a single wholesaler within a given area
bound all wholesalers within that area. Id at 99-100 (citing Midcal Aluminum v.
Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-84, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760 (1979)). A licensee, found
to be selling below the established prices, may be fined or have his license suspended
or revoked. Id. at 100 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24880 (West Supp. 1980)).
89. Id. at 100. According to charges by the California Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, Midcal Aluminum, a wholesale distributor of wine in Southern
California, sold 27 cases of wine at less than the effective price schedule set by the E.
& J. Gallo Winery. Id. It was also alleged that Midcal had sold wines for which no
fair trade contract or schedule had been filed. Id Midcal stipulated that the allega-
tions were true, but filed a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal for the
Third Appellate District seeking an injunction against the state's wine pricing system.
Id.
90. Id. at 105-06. Before the Court reached the issue of whether the state action
doctrine protected the California plan, the Court addressed the issue of whether Cali-
fornia's plan for wine pricing violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 102. The Court found
that the "system for wine pricing plainly constitute[d] resale price maintenance in
violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 103 (citations omitted).
The Court found that under the California plan, the state had authorized and
enforced prices established by private parties, but did not review the reasonableness
of the prices or regulate the terms of the fair trade contract. Id at 105-06. The Court
also found that the state did not monitor market conditions or engage in any
"pointed reexamination" of the program. Id. at 106 (footnote omitted).
91. Id at 106.
92. 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), cerl. granted sub noma. Hoover v. Ronwin, 103 S.
Ct. 2084 (1983) and cert. dented, Ronwin v. Hoover, 103 S. Ct. 2110 (1983).
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violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act.93 The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant grading committee, its individual members, their wives, and the
state bar, illegally restricted competition among attorneys practicing in Ari-
zona by admitting a predetermined number of persons "without reference to
'achievement by each bar applicant of a pre-set standard [of compe-
tence].' ,94 The court determined that in contrast to Bates, the restraint
challenged in Ronwzn "was not adopted or directly authorized by the Ari-
zona Supreme Court."'9 5 According to the court, the fact that the Arizona
Supreme Court had delegated to the committee the authority to examine
applicants and had retained an oversight capacity regarding the admissions
decisions, was insufficient to immunize the committee's grading policies.
96
Although the Midcal decision limited the scope of the state action doc-
trine, anticompetitive professional activity may still be immune from anti-
trust liability if that activity has been mandated by a self-regulating
organization that acts as an arm of the state. For example, in Benson v. Ari
zona State Board of Dental Examiners ,97 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that allegedly anticompetitive licensing practices
promulgated by the Board of Dental Examiners constituted state action and
were, therefore, immune from antitrust liability. 98 In Benson, twenty-five
dentists licensed to practice in states other than Arizona challenged a licens-
ing scheme which permitted only dentists who had passed the state's den-
tistry examination to practice in Arizona for compensation, but permitted
dentists licensed in other states to obtain a "restricted permit" which allowed
them to practice as unsalaried employees of charitable dental clinics. 99 The
court found that the two-prong standard of Mdcal had been satisfied be-
cause the challenged licensing practices were clearly articulated in the state's
statutes and expressed as state policy, and the state, through the Board of
93. Id at 694-95.
94. Id at 695.
95. Id The court noted that in Bates, "the real party in interest was the Arizona
Supreme Court because it had adopted the challenged restraint." Id The court as-
serted that the facts in Ronwin were more analogous to Goldfarb than Bates. Id. at 695-
96. The court asserted that the characteristic which distinguished Goldfarb from Bates
was that the challenged restraints in Bates were "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy and [were] actively supervised by the state itself." Id. at 696
(citations omitted).
96. Id The court indicated that its decision might have been different if it had
been made clear at the district court level that the rules of the Arizona Supreme
Court required submission of the committee's proposed grading formula at least 30
days before each examination. Id at 697 (citing ARIZ. SuP. CT. R. 28(c)(VII)(B)
(effective Jan. 15, 1974)).
97. 673 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1982).
98. Id at 275.
99. Id. at 273. The dentists alleged that the State Board of Dental Examiners
had combined with Arizona dentists and dentists' organizations to restrain and mo-
nopolize the practice of dentristry in Arizona by restricting entry into the profession,
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Dental Examiners, actively supervised the licensing scheme. 0 0
The anticompetitive actions of a state agency, however, will not neces-
sarily be immune from antitrust liability. °10 Although it has been argued
successfully that a state agency is the "state" for state action purposes, the
Goldfarb Court recognized a distinction between the state and its agencies,
concluding that immunity will not be granted to every entity simply because
it is labeled a "state agency."'
0 2
D. The Professions and the McCarran-Ferguson Act
In analyzing an activity to determine if it is within the scope of the
100. Id at 275. The court found that the first prong of the Midcal test, requiring
that there be a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, was satis-
fied by the Arizona statutes. Id These statutes expressly established the State Board
of Dental Examiners, conferred upon the Board the power to regulate the practice of
dentistry and admission into that practice, and directed the Board to both administer
examinations as a prerequisite for a dental license and establish the system of re-
stricted permits. Id (citations omitted).
The court also found that the second prong of the Mdcal test, requiring actual
supervision by the state, was satisfied in Benson. Id. The court found the state super-
vision of the Board of Dental Examiners to be "just as much active state supervision"
as the Arizona Supreme Court's supervision in Bates, 673 F.2d at 275 (citing Bates,
433 U.S. at 362). For a discussion of Bates, see notes 81-84 and accompanying text
supra.
101. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 103-06 (1980); Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791-92. For a discussion of Goldfarb
as it relates to the "state action" doctrine, see notes 57-59 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of Midcal, see notes 85-91 and accompanying text supra.
102. 421 U.S. at 791-92. The Supreme Court reiterated its view that the state
action doctrine is to be narrowly construed when it found that a city could not avail
itself of the state action doctrine, even though the city derived its power from the
state constitution. Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
Boulder was primarily concerned with the application of the state action doctrine to
cities and municipalities. Id. at 43. The city of Boulder, as a "home rule" municipal-
ity, had been granted "the full right of self-government in local and municipal mat-
ters" by the Colorado Constitution. Id As a result of this "home rule" status, city
ordinances superseded the law of the state in local and municipal matters. Id at 43-
44. An ordinance passed by the Boulder City Council, regulating cable television
within the city, limited the Boulder Communications Company (BCC) to service of
only a part of the city. Id at 44. BCC sought an injunction against the city alleging
that these restrictions on BCC's business expansion violated § I of the Sherman Act.
Id at 46-47. The city responded that it enjoyed antitrust immunity under the "state
action" doctrine. Id. at 47.
In finding that the City of Boulder could not avail itself of the "state action"
doctrine, the Court stated, "A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please
can hardly be said to have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive action for
which municipal liability is sought." Id. at 55. A state's broad delegation of the full
right of self-government was not enough to satisfy the Midcal requirement that the
state itself authorize the anticompetitive practice. Id at 56.
In Boulder, the Court relied primarily on Lafayette V. Louisiana Power & Light Co.
Id. (citing Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389 (1978)). In Lafayette, a plurality of the Court noted
that municipalities would be shielded from antitrust liability by the "state action"
doctrine only if their actions were taken pursuant to an express state anticompetitive
policy. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412-13 (plurality
opinion). For a discussion of the facts of Lafayette, see note 94 supra.
[Vol. 29: p. 115
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss1/3
COMMENT
McCarran-Ferguson Act and thus exempt from antitrust liability, the criti-
cal determination is whether the activity in question is in "the business of
insurance" within the meaning of the Act. 10 3 Although the "business of in-
surance" had been broadly construed in the past, two recent Supreme Court
cases have greatly narrowed the scope of this term, thereby drastically reduc-
ing the usefulness of the McCarran Act exemption.
Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co. 104 involved an insur-
ance plan which reimbursed policyholders for the purchase price of prescrip-
tion drugs.' 0 5 In connection with this plan, the insurance company had an
agreement with certain "participating" pharmacists whereby these pharma-
cists would limit their mark-up on prescription drugs.' 0 6 When a group of
independent pharmacists challenged this agreement as anticompetitive, the
defendants asserted that the agreement was in the "business of insurance"
and therefore protected from antitrust scrutiny by the McCarran Act.' 0 7 In
holding that the agreement was not exempt from antitrust attack, the
Supreme Court ruled that the McCarran Act does not exempt insurance
companies, but rather, exempts the busiess of insurance, which consists of the
spreading and underwriting of policyholders' risks. 108 In addition to limit-
ing the exemption to the underwriting of risks, Royal Drug developed two
other criteria to aid in identifying the "business of insurance" touchstone.
First, the challenged practice must be an integral part of the relationship
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982). For the text of the relevant portions of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act and a discussion of the antitrust liability of the business of
insurance prior to the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see note 26 and ac-
companying text supra.
104. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
105. Id. at 209.
106. Id Group Life and Health Insurance Co., known as Blue Shield of Texas
(Blue Shield) offered to enter into a "Pharmacy Agreement" with each licensed phar-
macy in Texas. Id. Under the terms of this agreement, a participating pharmacy
agreed to furnish prescription drugs to Blue Shield's policyholders at a price of two
dollars for each prescription. Id. Blue Shield would then reimburse the pharmacy
for the pharmacy's cost of acquiring prescribed drugs. Id. If an insured under the
Blue Shield plan chose a pharmacy which had not entered into the pharmacy agree-
ment, the insured would have to pay the full amount to the pharmacy for that drug.
Id Blue Shield would then reimburse the insured for 75% of the difference between
the purchase price of the drug and two dollars. Id
107. Id. at 207-08. Eighteen owners of independent pharmacies brought an ac-
tion alleging that Blue Shield and three participating pharmacies had violated § I of
the Sherman Act by entering into an agreement to fix retail prices of drugs and
engaging in an unlawful group boycott. Id. at 207. The only issue before the
Supreme Court was whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempted the agreements
from the reach of the Sherman Act. Id at 210. The Court did not address the issue
of whether the agreements were illegal under the antitrust laws. Id.
108. Id at 210-14. The Court noted a distinction between risk reduction and
risk underwriting. Id. at 214 n. 12. The Court found that although the agreements
with the participating pharmacies may have been cost-saving arrangements which
may well have inured ultimately to the benefit of policyholders in the form of lower
premiums, the agreements did not involve any underwriting or spreading of risk. Id.
at 214. In essence, the agreements were merely arrangements for the purchase of
goods and services by Blue Shield. Id
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between insurers and insured;' 0 9 and second, the practice must be limited to
persons within the insurance industry.11 °
The Royal Drug criteria were applied directly to the price-setting prac-
tices between an insurer and a professional association in Uni'ed Labor Life
Insurance Co. v. Pireno. " In Pireno, United Labor Life Insurance Co. (ULL)
issued policies under which the company agreed to reimburse its insureds
"reasonable" claims for "necessary" chiropractic treatment.1 12 ULL used a
peer review committee of practicing chiropractors to determine whether fees
and services were reasonable and necessary within the meaning of the pol-
icy.1 13 When the use of the committee was alleged to be a vehicle for fixing
prices, ULL asserted that the practice was exempt from antitrust scrutiny as
part of the "business of insurance."'1 4 The Court applied the Royal Drug
criteria and determined that the practice was subject to antitrust scrutiny,
1
15
finding that the practice was not involved in the underwriting of insurance
risks, was not an integral part of the relationship between insurer and in-
sured, and was not limited solely to members of the insurance industry. 16
109. Id at 215-16. The Court noted that in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, Congress was concerned with
[the relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which
could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement-these were
the core of the "business of insurance." Undoubtedly, other activities of
insurance companies relate so closely to their status as reliable insurers that
they too must be placed in the same class. But whatever the exact scope of
the statutory term, it is clear where the focus was-it was on the relation-
ship between the insurance company and the policyholder.
Id (quoting SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969)).
110. 440 U.S. at 231. The Court not only stated that exemptions from the anti-
trust laws were to be narrowly construed, but also noted that in analogous situations
such exemptions may be forfeited when an exempt entity acts in concert with a non-
exempt party. Id. The Court stated that this narrow construction was "particularly
appropriate" in Royal Drug "because the Pharmacy Agreements involve[d] parties
wholly outside the insurance industry." Id.
111. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
112. Id at 122. ULL was a Maryland insurer doing business in New York. Id.
As required by New York law, ULL's health insurance policies covered certain claims
for chiropractic treatments. Id. Certain ULL policies, however, limited ULL's liabil-
ity to " 'reasonable charges' for 'necessary medical care and services.' " Id. (emphasis in
original).
113. Id at 123. The committee was composed of 10 practicing New York chiro-
practors who served as members of the New York State Chiropractor Association
(NYSCA) on a voluntary basis. Id At the request of an insurer, the committee
would examine a chiropractor's treatments and charges in a particular case. Id. The
committee would then render an opinion on the necessity of the treatments and the
reasonableness of the amounts charged. Id.
114. Id at 124.
115. Id at 129-34.
116. Id. The Court found that none of these criteria was necessarily determina-
tive in itself of whether a particular practice is exempted from the antitrust laws. Id.
at 129. However, by scrutinizing the arrangement between ULL and the NYSCA
with respect to all three criteria, the Court concluded that the agreement was not a
part of the "business of insurance." Id.
ULL argued that their use of the peer review committee played a part in the
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E. The Professions and Their Associations
In Goldfarb, the Supreme Court contrasted the fixed fee schedule of the
county bar association with a purely advisory fee schedule, stating that an
advisory fee schedule would have presented the Court with a different ques-
tion.11 7 Although this dictum from Goldfarb indicated that purely advisory
activities of professional associations may escape antitrust liability, the Court
retreated from this position in American Sociey of Mechanical Engineers v.
Hydrolevel Corp. 118 In Mechanical Engineers, Hydrolevel, a manufacturer of a
safety device for heating boilers brought an action against the American So-
ciety of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), claiming that improper activity on
the part of ASME members in interpreting boiler and pressure vessel codes,
violated the Sherman Act. 119 Hydrolevel alleged that the interpretation of
the codes, which had a negative bearing on the safety of its product, was
substantially influenced by the vice chairman of an ASME subcommittee,
who also served as vice president of one of Hydrolevel's competitors.' 20 Al-
spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk because the review practice
"help[ed] 'determine whether the risk . . . ha[d] been transferred' and acted as 'an
aid in determining the scope of the transfer.' " Id. at 130 (quoting Brief for the Peti-
tioner at 17, Preno, 458 U.S. at 119). The Court rejected this argument, finding no
logical or temporal connection between the arrangement and the transfer of risk ac-
complished by the insurance policies. Id. The Court noted that "[t]he transfer of risk
from insured to insurer is effected by means of the contract between the parties-the
insurance policy-and that transfer is complete at the time that the contract is en-
tered." Id (citing 9 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 39:53, 39:63 (2d
ed. 1962)).
The Court also stated that the peer review process was not an integral part of the
relationship between insured and insurer. Id. at 131-32. The Court noted that when
presented with policyholder claims, ULL alone could decide whether the claims were
covered by the policies. Id. at 132. According to the Court, ULL's use of the peer
review committee was "a matter of indifference to the policyholder, whose only con-
cern is whether his claim is paid, not why it is paid." Id (emphasis in original).
The Court found that the challenged peer review practice would not be denied
McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption solely because it involved parties outside the in-
surance industry. Id. at 133. However, the Court went on to state that "involvement
of such [outside] parties, even if not dispositive, constitutes part of the inquiry man-
dated by the Royal Drug analysis." Id. The Court noted that § 2(b) of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act was intended primarily to protect intra-industry cooperation in the
underwriting of risks, and arrangements between insurance companies and parties
outside the insurance industry were not the focus of congressional concern. Id. (citing
Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 221). The Court further reasoned that "[m]ore importantly,
such arrangements may prove contrary to the spirit as well as the letter of § 2(b) [of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act], because they have the potential to restrain competition
in noninsurance markets." 458 U.S. at 133.
117. 421 U.S. at 781 (citations omitted).
118. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
119. Id at 559-60.
120. Id. at 559-62. McDonnell & Miller, Inc. (M&M), a member of ASME,
designed "low-water fuel cutoffs" for heating boilers. Id at 560. The cutoffs were
necessary to prevent fires or explosions which could occur when the water in a boiler
drops below a level sufficient to moderate the boiler's temperature. Id. at 559.
Hydrolevel Corp., a non-member of ASME, devised a variant of the low-water
fuel cutoff used by M&M. Id at 560. Although M&M had dominated the market
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though ASME was not aware of the improper activities and in no way bene-
fited from these activities, the Court, employing an agency theory, found
ASME liable for the anticompetitive acts of its volunteer members. 12 1 In so
doing, the Court expressed concern about the potential for anticompetitive
abuses by standard-setting associations, noting that interpretations of so-
called "voluntary standards" set by influential organizations such as ASME
often become compulsory standards through incorporation into various local
and national laws.122 In addition, the Court went on to state that the impo-
sition of liability on a standard-setting organization like ASME best served
Congress' intent of deterring antitrust violations because the organization is
best situated to prevent antitrust violations through abuse of its
for low-water fuel cutoffs for decades, Hydrolevel was able to induce an important
M&M customer to switch to the Hydrolevel device. Id An M&M vice-president was
vice chairman of the ASME subcommittee which drafted, revised and interpreted the
segment of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code governing low-water fuel cutoffs. Id.
After M&M had lost the important customer to Hydrolevel, the vice-president of
M&M and other M&M officials met with the chairman of the ASME subcommittee.
Id at 560-61. The participants of the meeting drafted a letter to the subcommittee
implicity raising concerns about a feature of the Hydrolevel device. Id. at 561. The
letter, signed by another M&M vice president, was mailed to the secretary of the
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee. Id. The secretary referred the letter to the
chairman of the subcommittee as part of the standard routine. Id. The chairman
then drafted an "unofficial response" even though he was one of the authors of this
public inquiry. Id The chairman did not have to refer to the entire subcommittee
because his response was "unofficial." Id This response was signed by the secretary
of the committee and sent out on ASME stationary. Id The response indicated that
Hydrolevel's device might not meet ASME standards and could be dangerous. Id at
561-62. M&M then used this response from ASME as a marketing tool to discourage
customers from purchasing Hydrolevel's low-water fuel cutoffs. Id at 562.
121. Id. at 570. The Court held that ASME would be liable for its agent's ac-
tions because the agent had acted with apparent authority. Id. at 566-67. The the-
ory of apparent authority was, according to the Court, consistent with congressional
intent to encourage competition. Id at 570. The Court found that "when [ASME]
cloaks its subcommittee officials with the authority of its reputation, [it] permits those
agents to affect the destinies of businesses and thus gives them the power to frustrate
competition in the marketplace." Id at 570-71.
ASME argued that treble damages for antitrust violations constituted punitive
damages, and under traditional agency law, courts do not employ apparent authority
to impose punitive damages upon a principal for acts of its agents. I. at 574-75
(citations omitted). The Court agreed that antitrust treble damages were designed in
part to punish past antitrust violations. Id at 575. However, the Court noted that
because treble damages served as a means of both deterring future violators and com-
pensating victims, it was in accord with both the purposes of antitrust law and the
principles of agency law to hold ASME liable for treble damages as the result of the
acts of its agents. Id at 575-76.
122. Id. at 559 & 571. One of ASME's primary functions is to promulgate and
publish codes and standards for areas of engineering and industry. Id at 559. Al-
though only advisory, these codes are extremely important since they are incorpo-
rated by reference into many federal, state, and city laws and regulations. d For
example, the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code involved in the Hydrolevel dispute had
been adopted by 46 states and all but one of the Canadian provinces. Id. The force
of ASME's reputation was so great that M&M was able to use one "unofficial" re-
sponse to injure seriously Hydrolevel's business. Id at 571.
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reputation. 1 2 3
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Powell stated that the Court had
devised what amounted to a rule of strict liability for voluntary associations
in antitrust cases. 124 Justice Powell went on to argue that the Court was so
intent on imposing antitrust liability "that it pu[t] . . . at risk much of the
beneficial private activity of the voluntary associations of our country."' 125
In concluding, Justice Powell noted that the extent of the majority's holding
was unclear, and expressed concern that "the new doctrine. . . [would] be
read as exposing the array of nonprofit associations-professional, charitable,
educational, and even religious-to a new theory of strict liability in treble
damages."' 26 Thus, in holding that purely advisory activities of a profes-
sional association may be subject to the strictures of the antitrust laws, the
Court appears to have retreated from its dicta in Goldfarb.
Finally, in Blue Shildy. McCready,' 27 the Supreme Court further demon-
strated a willingness to impose antitrust liability upon professionals. In Mc-
Cready, an employee was provided coverage under a group health insurance
plan purchased by her employer from Blue Shield. 128 The plan provided
reimbursement for the cost of treatment for nervous disorders. 129 Blue
Shield refused to provide reimbursement however, citing a provision in the
insurance policy which required that treatment provided by a psychologist
be supervised by, and billed through, a physician.' 30 McCready brought
123. Id. at 572-74. The Court found that only ASME could take systematic
steps to deter improper conduct on the part of its agents. Id. at 572. Further, the
Court stated that imposition of civil liability would be a strong incentive for ASME's
agents to refrain from such conduct. Id.
124. Id at 592 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell characterized the imposi-
tion of treble damages based solely on an apparent authority theory of liability as a
"dubious new doctrine" which had not even been argued in the lower courts. )d at
584 (Powell, J., dissenting).
125. Id at 594 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell accused the majority of
being "so zealous to impose treble-damages liability that it ignore[d] a basic purpose
of the Sherman Act: the preservation of private action contributing to the public
welfare." Id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438-43 (1978)) (emphasis in original). Justice Powell
recognized that nonprofit associations were subject to the antitrust laws. Id at 580
(Powell, J., dissenting). However, he pointed out that the Court had previously
noted in Goldfarb that antitrust laws need not be applied to professional organizations
in exactly the same manner as they are applied to commercial enterprises. Id. (citing
Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17). Justice Powell expressed surprise that the Court took
the occasion of the Hydrolevel case "to promulgate an expansive rule of antitrust lia-
bility not heretofore applied by it to a commercial enterprise much less to a nonprofit
organization." Id at 580-81 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell also stated that to his knowledge, Hydrolevel was the first case in
which the Court had explicitly held a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization subject to
treble-damages liability. 456 U.S. at 580 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
126. Id at 594 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
127. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
128. Id. at 467-68.
129. Id at 468.
130. Id McCready's treatment had neither been billed through, nor supervised
by, a physician. Id
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suit against Blue Shield and the Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia, alleg-
ing that they had conspired to exclude psychologists from receiving compen-
sation under the insurance plan, and that Blue Shield's failure to reimburse
was in furtherance of that conspiracy.13 The Court remanded the case for a
hearing on the merits,' 3 2 even though there was considerable doubt as to
whether McCready had suffered economic injury and had standing to
sue.' 33 Significantly, the Court did not even mention the possibility that the
131. Id at 468-70. McCready brought a class action suit on behalf of all Blue
Shield subscribers who had incurred costs for psychologists since 1973, but who had
not been reimbursed for such expenses. Id at 468-69. The complaint alleged that
Blue Shield and the Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia had conspired to exclude
clinical psychologists from receiving compensation under the Blue Shield plans, in
violation of § I of the Sherman Act. Id at 469-70. McCready further alleged that
failure to reimburse her was in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy and it resulted
in injury to her business or property which entitled her to treble damages and attor-
ney's fees under § 4 of the Clayton Act. 457 U.S. at 470 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982)).
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
132. The district court had dismissed the suit, holding that McCready had no
standing to sue under § 4 of the Clayton Act. 457 U.S. at 470 (footnote omitted).
The district court held that the alleged boycott was intended to exclude psychologists
from the psychotherapy market only, and that while McCready had suffered an in-
jury, it was too indirect and remote to be considered antitrust injury. Id at 470-71.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
versed, holding that although the boycott was directed at clinical psychologists, Mc-
Cready's property loss was directly or proximately caused by the boycott and her
losses were not too remote or indirect to be covered by the Act. Id at 471. The
Fourth Circuit then remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 471-72.
133. Id at 485. In reaching its decision, the Court first considered whether the
plaintiff's claim for damages was barred by the doctrine set forth in Ilhnols BrIck Co. v.
Ilhhoi , where the Court announced a rule which bars suits for damages by indirect
purchasers against antitrust violators. Id at 474-75 (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi-
nois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)). According to the McCready Court, the result in Illinoir
Brick was based on a desire to avoid "the risk of duplicative recovery engendered by
allowing every person along a chain of distribution to claim damages arising from a
single transaction that violated the antitrust laws." Id. at 474-75. The Court con-
cluded that this policy concern was not present in McCready, noting that because the
psychologist had been fully paid for his services and therefore had suffered no anti-
trust injury, the patient alone remained to recover against Blue Shield. Id. at 475.
The Court next considered whether the plaintiff had standing to sue. Id at 476.
In making that determination, the Court looked to two factors: first, whether there
was a sufficient physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation and the
harm to the plaintiff; and second, whether the injury alleged was one about which
Congress was likely to have been concerned when it allowed private parties to main-
tain antitrust actions. Id at 478. Applying the first criterion to McCread, the Court
concluded that a consumer of psychotherapeutic services who has been denied bene-
fits under an insurance plan because the services were performed by a psychologist,
rather than a psychiatrist, has clearly suffered an economic injury resulting from an-
ticompetitive practices. Id at 478-79. In applying the second criterion to McCready,
the Court found that although McCready had not suffered the typical anticompeti-
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defendants should be afforded special protection from antitrust liability due
to their professional status.1
34
VI. PROFESSIONALS AND SPECIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE ANTITRUST
LAWS-AN ANALYSIS
While at one time there was considerable question as to whether profes-
sional activity fell outside the ambit of the antitrust laws, there is no longer
any valid argument that this exclusion still exists.135 The important ques-
tion which remains is whether activities involving professionals, as opposed
to commercial or non-professional activities, are to be accorded any prefer-
ential treatment under the antitrust laws.' 36 A reading of the cases subse-
quent to Goldfarb indicates that no such preferential treatment has been
given professionals. Although the now famous footnote from Goldfarb indi-
cates an answer to the contrary, a closer analysis is required.137 In Goldfarb,
the Court stated that a particular practice which would violate the Sherman
Act in one context may have to be treated differently in a professional con-
text. 138 Yet, it is submitted that the Court has not found any such situations
and has abandoned its cautionary dicta in Goldfarb.' 39 For example, in Pro-
tive harm of increased fees or diminished competition, the harm caused was "inextri-
cably intertwined with the injury conspirators sought to inflict on
psychologists. ... Id. at 484.
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that a person is not injured merely because he
voluntarily chooses to spend money for services not covered by his insurance policy.
Id at 494 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Nowhere in either the majority or dissenting opinions in McCread is the
Goldfarb dicta mentioned. It is also significant that the Supreme Court did not ad-
dress the issue of the availability of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption to the peti-
tioners. Id at 470 n.7.
135. Goldfarb was the first decision by the Supreme Court to address directly the
issue of the professions' potential liability under the Sherman Act. For a discussion of
how the belief that the "learned professions" were not covered by the Sherman Act
arose, see notes 12-21 and accompanying text supra.
136. Now that the professions have been drawn into the antitrust circle by cases
such as Goldfarb, Professional Engineers, and Maricopa County, the focus of the profes-
sions' concern must be on whether the vast precedents of antitrust law will be applied
to situations involving the professions in the same manner that they have been ap-
plied to other situations, or whether the professions may indeed be accorded special
treatment. For a discussion of Goldfarb, see notes 47-59 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of Professional Engineers, see notes 63-69 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of Maricopa County, see notes 73-79 and accompanying text supra.
137. Footnote 17 of the Goldfarb opinion stated that under an antitrust analysis
the practices of the professions may be distinguished from other business situations.
421 U.S. at 788 n.17. For the full text of footnote 17 of Goldfarb, see note 54supra.
138. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17. The Goldfarb Court did not give any guidance as to
what situations might cause the professions to be treated differently under antitrust
laws.
139. In Professional Engineers, the Court, although not formally retreating from
its statement in Goldfarb, indicated that "the cautionary footnote in Goldfarb . . . can-
not be read as fashioning a broad exemption under the Rule of Reason for learned
professions." 435 U.S. at 696. In Marcopa County, the Court again reiterated its state-
ment from Goldfarb, but then held that in regard to price-fixing agreements, the Sher-
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fessi'onal Engieers, the defendant advanced an argument that appeared to be
based solely upon the Goldfarb footnote. ' 40 There, the defendant's argument
that anticompetitive activity may be protected where the restrained activity
involves a public service aspect of professional activity was soundly rejected
by the Court. 14 1 Although the Court did not specifically retreat from its
position in Goldfarb, it severely restricted it by stating that ethical norms may
be considered in the rule of reason only when they serve to regulate and
promote competition. 142
The Court further retreated from the language of the Goldfarb footnote
in Mancopa Couny. 14 3 In Marcopa County, the Court refused to look into the
economics of the health care industry, stating that price-fixing agreements
are per se violations of the Sherman Act, no matter what industry is in-
volved.' 44 It is therefore submitted that the Court has precluded any argu-
ment that a restraint, which classically has been accorded per se treatment,
should be deemed to have a different affect on competition in a professional
setting than in a non-professional setting.145 However, the Maricopa County
Court was again able to avoid formal retreat from its position in Goldfarb,
man Act " 'establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike.' " 457 U.S.
at 349 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940)).
Justice Powell in his dissenting opinion in Mechanical Engineers criticized the
Court for backing away from its position in Goldfarb and applying "an expansive rule
of antitrust liability" to a professional nonprofit organization. 456 U.S. at 580-81
(Powell, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice Powell's dissent in MechanicalEngi-
neers, see notes 124-26 and accompanying text supra.
140. 435 U.S. at 684-85. In Goldfarb, the Court stated that "[tihe public service
aspect and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context,
be treated differently." 421 U.S. at 788 n. 17. For the full text of footnote 17, see note
54 supra. In Professional Engineers, the National Society of Professional Engineers (So-
ciety) advanced a justification for their ban on competitive bidding based on the
premise that the rule was necessary to protect the public from potentially faulty con-
struction. 435 VS. at 684-85. For a further discussion of Professional Engineers, see
notes 63-69 and accompanying text supra.
141. For a discussion of the Court's rejection of the Society's "public service"
defense, see notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
142. For a discussion of the Professional Engineers narrowing of Goldfarb's footnote
17, see notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
143. For a discussion of Maricopa County, see notes 73-79 and accompanying text
supra.
144. 457 U.S. at 349 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 222 (1940)).
145. The Court in Maricopa County quoted with approval the language from
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, that indicated that the very purpose of a per se rule
was to avoid complex and prolonged analysis of various industries. 457 U.S. at 350-
51 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). Once a profes-
sion has been proved to have engaged in activities that have been labeled as classical
per se violations of the Sherman Act, no further analysis will be allowed.
Despite Maricopa Couny, some lower federal courts have attempted to avoid the
strict application of theperse rule to alleged antitrust violations committed by profes-
sionals. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 691 F.2d 678 (1982)
(analyzing group boycott, usually accordedper se treatment, under the rule of reason
analysis). For a discussion of Trustees of Rex Hospital, see note 79 supra.
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stating that the price-fixing agreements were not premised on public-service
or ethical norms. 146 However, given the Court's holding in Professional Engi-
neers that the rule of reason analysis is limited to an examination of competi-
tive effects, it is difficult to see how the Court's holding would have been
different in Maricopa County had the physicians advanced a public service or
ethical norms justification for their actions. 147 To be consistent with Profes-
sional Engineers, it is submitted that the Court could not have accepted any
argument that competition needed to be restrained to promote some ethical
norm. ' 48 It is further suggested that a professional advancing an ethical con-
sideration in defense of a potential restraint of trade will be accorded no
more deference by the courts than the non-professional asserting an ethical
consideration in defense of an alleged anticompetitive act.1
4 9
The Supreme Court's holdings in the last few years indicate a strong
willingness to pull professionals into the circle of antitrust liability. 150 Apart
from Goldfarb, there are other Supreme Court decisions which substantially
affect the relationship between the professions and the antitrust laws. 5' For
example, the narrowing of the state action doctrine by the decision in Mdcal
greatly diminished the power of state agencies to promulgate anticompeti-
tive rules and regulations at their own discretion. 152 Currently, any state
agency restricting competition, whether among the professions or not, must
146. 457 U.S. at 348-49. For a discussion of Maricopa County, see notes 73-79 and
accompanying text supra.
147. In Professional Engieers, the Court noted that the rule of reason cannot en-
compass factors which bear no relation to the competitive effect of the activity. 435
U.S. at 692. For a discussion of the Court's holding in Professional Engineers, see note
65 and accompanying text supra.
148. Even if the Court had allowed a rule of reason analysis in Maricopa County
and the physicians had advanced several persuasive arguments as to why their maxi-
mum price fixing enhanced the quality of medical services, these arguments could
not have been considered under the Professional Engineers view of the rule of reason.
For a discussion of the Court's view in Professional Engineers of the rule of reason analy-
sis, see notes 65-69 and accompanying text supra.
149. But see Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 696. In Professional Engineers, the
Court cited with approval Trpoh Co. v. Wella Corp. as an example of a case where
ethical norms properly were considered when assessing the impact of a practice upon
competition. Id (citing Trpoh, 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc)). The Tripoli
case did not involve professionals and is very limited in application, since the Tripoh
court found no "meaningful" effects on competition. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425
F.2d 932, 939 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc). For a discussion of the Trhoh case and its
relation to Professional Engineers, see note 68 supra.
150. In Mechanical Engineers for example, the Court applied what Justice Powell
considered to be "new law" to find a voluntary professional organization liable under
an apparent authority theory in an antitrust case. 456 U.S. at 581 (Powell, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original). For a discussion of Justice Powell's dissent in Mechani-
cal Engineers, see notes 124-26 and accompanying text supra.
151. For a discussion of the cases involving the professions and the "state ac-
tion" doctrine, see notes 80-102 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
cases involving the professions and the MeCarran-Ferguson Act exemption, see notes
103-16 and accompanying text supra.
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do so at the explicit authorization of the state and for the purpose of further-
ing a clearly-articulated state policy. 153 It is submitted that this decision
greatly reduces the availability of the state action doctrine in defending
against allegations of antitrust violations. 154
It is further submitted that the Supreme Court, in Royal Drug and
Pireno, removed from the professions the availability of the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act exemption.155 There may be cases where an agreement between a
group of professionals and an insurer involves the spreading of insurance
risks and the agreement is an integral part of the relationship between the
insurer and the insured. However, the requirement that the Act be applied
only to members of the insurance industry effectively precludes this exemp-
tion from aiding the professions despite a particular agreement's integral re-
lationship with the insurance industry.
156
It is also submitted that in two recent cases, McCread and Mechanical
Engteers, the Court has shown an increased willingness to impose antitrust
liability upon professionals. 15 7 In McCready, the Court did not even address
the possibility that professionals should be afforded some form of immunity
from antitrust suits when it permitted a plaintiff to sue a group of physicians
for allegedly anticompetitive acts.' 5 8 In Mechanical Engneers, the Court ex-
pressed its concern over the potential for anticompetitive actions by stan-
dard-setting organizations and formulated an extensive rule imposing
liability on such organizations.'
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VII. CONCLUSION
The professions are in a new era with respect to their relationship with
the antitrust laws. No longer can professionals assume that their practices
will go unnoticed under the antitrust laws.160 In fact, it appears that profes-
sional action is being scrutinized more than ever before. '6 1 The professions
153. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
154. For a discussion of the standards necessary for action to be exempt from the
Sherman Act, see notes 85-102 and accompanying text supra.
155. For a discussion of Royal Drug, see notes 104-10 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of Pireno, see notes 111-16 and accompanying text supra.
156. For a discussion of the requirements necessary to invoke the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exemption, see notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
157. For a discussion of MechanicalEngineers, see notes 118-26 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of McCready, see notes 127-34 and accompanying text
supra.
158. 457 U.S. at 465.
159. 456 U.S. at 570-74. For a discussion of Aechanical Engineers, see notes 118-
26 and accompanying text supra.
160. One commentator has noted that the antitrust actions brought by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission in the past were directed at occupations such as dairies, bak-
eries, and steel-makers, but are now often directed at doctors, lawyers, accountants,
and pharmacists. See Kauper, Antitrust and The Professions. An Overview, 52 ANTi-
TRUST L.J. 163, 164 (1983).
161. As one commentator has noted, "By rough count, five times as many
health antitrust actions have been brought since the epic Goldfarb decision in 1975,
[Vol. 29: p. 115
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must now take a hard look at their various practices to determine which of
them have as their purpose the protection of the public welfare and which
serve to restrict competition. The best method for avoiding antitrust
problems may be for professionals to stop viewing themselves as different
from individuals and organizations in the main-stream of commerce.
162
Even with this extensive antitrust analysis of the professions, there may
not be radical change in the manner professionals practice.1 6 3 Many, if not
most of the rules surrounding the professions are intended to serve the public
good and promote or simply regulate competition.164 However, the changes
that come from the stricter application of the antitrust laws to the profes-
sions may actually strengthen the professions and the services they provide to
the public.' 65 If this proves to be the case, it will certainly strengthen the
belief that the intent behind the Sherman Act was correct-that competition
best serves the needs of our society.1
66
Dennis R. Bartholomew*
than during the previous 85 years of Sherman Act history." Halper, The Health Care
Industry and Antitrust Laws- Collision Course? 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 17, 17 (1980) (footnote
omitted).
162. See Kauper, supra note 160, at 166-67.
163. The medical profession has already attempted to make an "end-run"
around the antitrust laws by attempting to remove the American Medical Associa-
tion from the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission. This move was unsuc-
cessful. See Kauper, supra note 160, at 176.
A strategy which may be in the best interest of both professionals and society
may be to require professionals to simply review their practices to determine whether
they truly serve a public good which could not better be served in some manner less
detrimental to competition.
164. See Clanton, The FTC and the Professions, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 209, 210-11
(1983).
165. See Sachs, Antitrust, The States, and the Professions, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 189-
206 (1983).
166. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). In Northern
Pacific, the Court stated:
[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources,
the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress,
while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preser-
vation of our democratic, political and social institutions.
Id.
* Villanova Law School, Class of 1983; Member, Pennsylvania Bar. This com-
ment was written while Mr. Bartholomew was an associate editor on the Villanova
Law Review.
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